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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyse a block cipher mode of operation 
submitted in 2014 to the cryptographic competition for 
authenticated encryption (CAESAR). This mode is designed by 
Recacha and called ++AE (plus-plus-ae). We propose a chosen 
plaintext forgery attack on ++AE that requires only a single 
chosen message query to allow an attacker to construct multiple 
forged messages. Our attack is deterministic and guaranteed to 
pass ++AE integrity check. We demonstrate the forgery attack 
using 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher. Hence, ++AE 
is insecure as an authenticated encryption mode of operation.  
CCS Concepts
• Security and privacy~Cryptanalysis and
other attacks 
Keywords
Authenticated encryption; ++AE; confidentiality; integrity; block 
cipher; forgery attack; symmetric encryption; CAESAR; AEAD. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Authenticated encryption (AE) is a scheme that provides both data 
confidentiality and integrity [1]. Confidentiality ensures that only 
the intended recipient can read the contents of a transmitted 
message, while data integrity assures that the contents have not 
been altered during transmission by unauthorised means [4]. 
Some security protocols do not require all data to be encrypted, 
such as protocol headers that need to be in clear text in order to be 
identified by different communicating parties. Therefore, 
Rogaway [9] singles out a new version of AE schemes, called 
authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD), where the 
associated data are authenticated only. 
One common approach to provide AE and AEAD is through 
block cipher modes. One of these proposed modes is ++AE (plus-
plus-ae) [8]; a candidate submitted to the Competition for 
Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and 
Robustness (CAESAR) [2]. 
++AE is an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) 
mode of operation for a block cipher of arbitrary block length and 
key size. Recacha designed ++AE [8] based on his previously 
proposed AE schemes, namely IOBC [6] and IOC [7]. All 
Recacha’s schemes, IOBC, IOC and ++AE, use a block cipher in 
ECB mode with cross block chaining and a detectable redundancy 
paradigm for integrity check rather than computing a message 
authentication code (MAC). Compared to other similar modes, 
++AE has some sophisticated features, such as it is parallelisable, 
has minimal overhead and supports the authentication of 
associated data [8]. 
In Recacha’s earlier schemes [6], the communicating parties agree 
on a predefined value, called Integrity Check Vector (ICV). This 
is appended to the end of the plaintext message before encryption 
(see Figure 1). The encrypted ICV block is referred to as a 
Modification Detection Code (MDC). During decryption, errors in 
ciphertext are propagated to the last block (MDC). The altered 
MDC yields the decryption of an incorrect ICV. Only messages 
with the expected ICV are accepted as authentic. As will be 
discussed later, ++AE uses a different method for determining the 
value of the ICV, although the verification process follows the 
same concept described above.  
Figure 1. Integrity mechanism [6] 
Weaknesses in previous designs using an ICV have been 
identified. Mitchell [5] showed that IOBC is vulnerable to a 
known plaintext forgery attack with a complexity of around 2
𝑛
3⁄ ,
where 𝑛 is the underlying block cipher block length. Bottinelli et 
al. [3] breach the integrity of IOC with a probability of 1 − 3 ×
2−𝑛.
This paper identifies a weakness in the integrity assurance 
mechanism of the ++AE mode. This weakness can be exploited in 
a chosen plaintext forgery attack similar to the attack approach by 
Bottinelli, Reyhanitabar and Vaudenay [3] in breaking the IOC 
authenticated encryption mode. For ++AE, if an attacker can 
obtain the ciphertext message corresponding to a chosen plaintext 
message containing two groups of four consecutive blocks 
anywhere before the last block, the attacker can construct multiple 
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forged messages in various ways. The forged ciphertext messages 
are constructed either by deleting the ciphertext blocks 
corresponding to one group and repeating the second group of 
ciphertext blocks, or swapping the ciphertext blocks of the two 
groups. The forged messages are guaranteed to decrypt to 
plaintexts that have an ICV identical to the ICV of the original 
plaintext message. Therefore, we break the integrity of ++AE as 
an AE scheme. 
This paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the 
++AE scheme. In Section 3 we outline a weakness in the ++AE 
structure related to the chaining mechanism. We also provide a 
mathematical proof of this. Section 4 proposes attack procedures 
using the weakness in the ++AE chaining mechanism. We 
demonstrate the forgery attacks using 128-bit AES as the 
underlying block cipher in Section 5. The last section draws a 
conclusion. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF ++AE 
This section describes the native encryption and decryption 
processes of ++AE as an AE mode of operation. Our description 
is based on Recacha’s paper [8] submitted to the CAESAR 
competition. Recacha submitted two versions: v1.0 in March 2014 
and the revised version v1.1 in April 2014. The encryption and 
decryption baseline procedures for ++AE mode are identical in 
both versions. 
 ++AE uses a 𝑘-bit key 𝐾 for encryption, decryption and 
authentication operations and vector initialisation. Let 𝜀𝐾(. ) 
denote the block cipher encryption function under the key 𝐾, and 
dK(. ) denote the decryption function under the same key. Let the 
block length of the block cipher be 𝑏 bits. Let 𝑃 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, … , 𝑃𝑁} 
be a plaintext message that consists of 𝑁 blocks of length 𝑏 bits. 
Suppose 𝐶 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, … , 𝐶𝑁} is the ciphertext obtained from 
encrypting the message 𝑃. Addition (+) and subtraction (−) are 
regular arithmetic operations modulo 2𝑏, while bitwise XOR 
operation is denoted as ⊕. 
Each message 𝑃 gets a secret and random value 𝑆. S is used to 
generate a pair of secret and random initial vectors denoted by 𝐼𝑉𝑎 
and 𝐼𝑉𝑏 each of length 𝑏 bits, such that  𝐼𝑉𝑎 =  𝜀𝐾(𝑆) and 𝐼𝑉𝑏 =
 𝜀𝐾(𝐼𝑉𝑎). For each plaintext message, the integrity check vector 
(𝐼𝐶𝑉) appended to the message is calculated as follows:  
𝐼𝐶𝑉 = (𝐼𝑉𝑎⨁𝑆) + (𝐼𝑉𝑏⨁(𝑁 + 𝑀)) 
where 𝑀 denotes the number of blocks of associated data. 
Defining the 𝐼𝐶𝑉 in this way provides some protection against 
forgery attacks in which the message length is changed, such as 
only deleting or inserting blocks. The ++AE encryption and 
decryption operations are described in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 
2 and illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Algorithm 1: ++AE Encryption 
1:   Encrypt𝐾(𝑆, 𝑃) 
2:   𝑄0 ← 𝐼𝑉𝑎 
3:   𝐼0 ← 𝐼𝑉𝑏 
4:   for 𝑖 ← 1 to 𝑁 do 
5:        𝐼𝑖 ← 𝑃𝑖 ⊕ 𝑄𝑖−1 
6:       𝑄𝑖 ← 𝐼𝑖 + 𝐼𝑖−1 + 𝑄𝑖−1 
7:       𝑋𝑖 ← 𝑄𝑖 ⊕ 𝐼𝑖−1 
8:       𝐶𝑖 ← 𝜀𝐾(𝑋𝑖)  
9:   end for 
10: 𝑀𝐷𝐶 ← 𝜀𝐾(((𝐼𝐶𝑉 ⊕ 𝑄𝑁) + 𝐼𝑁 + 𝑄𝑁) ⊕ 𝐼𝑁)    
11: return 𝐶||𝑀𝐷𝐶 = {𝐶1, … , 𝐶𝑁}||𝑀𝐷𝐶 
 
Algorithm 2: ++AE Decryption 
1:   Decrypt𝐾(𝑆, 𝐶||𝑀𝐷𝐶) 
2:   𝑄0 ← 𝐼𝑉𝑎 
3:   𝐼0 ← 𝐼𝑉𝑏  
4:   for 𝑖 ← 1 to 𝑁 do 
5:        𝑋𝑖 ← 𝑑𝐾(𝐶𝑖) 
6:        𝑄𝑖 ← 𝑋𝑖 ⊕ 𝐼𝑖−1 
7:         𝐼𝑖 ← 𝑄𝑖 − (𝐼𝑖−1 + 𝑄𝑖−1)  
8:        𝑃𝑖 ← 𝐼𝑖 ⊕ 𝑄𝑖−1 
9:   end for 
10: 𝐼𝐶𝑉′ ← ((𝑑𝐾(𝑀𝐷𝐶) ⊕ 𝐼𝑁) − (𝐼𝑁 + 𝑄𝑁)) ⊕ 𝑄𝑁 
11: if 𝐼𝐶𝑉′ = 𝐼𝐶𝑉 then 
12:      return 𝑃 = {𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝑁} 
13:else 
14:      return INVALID 
15: end if 
Figure 2. ++AE encryption [8] 
 
Figure 3. ++AE decryption [8] 
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3. FLAW IN ++AE STRUCTURE 
In this section, we first make some observations on the basic 
operations of ++AE scheme. Then, we apply the observations to 
point out a weakness in the ++AE structure. 
Note that the four summation operations and cross block chaining 
mechanism in ++AE occur prior to the block cipher encryption 
function in the encryption operation, or after the block cipher 
decryption function in the decryption operation. Therefore, the 
effect of the chaining propagates independently of the block 
cipher functions. We look at special cases of particular plaintext 
blocks that permit repetition of the internal chaining values, 𝑄 
and 𝐼. 
3.1 Plaintext blocks of value 𝟐𝐛 − 𝟏 
In this case, we consider plaintext blocks represented by the 
integer (2𝑏 − 1) or (−1 (mod 2𝑏)). We first start with the 
following lemma before explaining the flaw in ++AE mode. 
Lemma 1: Let (𝑎) be a 𝑏-bit binary number. Then, 
(2𝑏 − 1)⨁ 𝑎 ≡  2𝑏 − 1 − 𝑎 (mod 2𝑏). 
Proof:  
Let 𝑎 = ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0  be the binary representation of (𝑎). 
Then, (2𝑏 − 1)⨁ 𝑎 = (2𝑏 − 1)⨁ ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0            
                = ∑ 2𝑗𝑏−1𝑗=0 ⨁ ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0    
                = ∑ (1⨁ 𝑎𝑗)2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0  
                ≡ ∑ (1 − 𝑎𝑗)2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0 (mod 2
𝑏) 
                ≡ (∑ 2𝑗 −𝑏−1𝑗=0 ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗)𝑏−1𝑗=0 (mod 2
𝑏) 
                ≡ 2𝑏 − 1 − 𝑎(mod 2𝑏)                                                 
Theorem 1: Suppose   𝑃 = 𝑃1, 𝑃2, . . , 𝑃𝑁+1 (where 𝑁 ≥ 4) is a 
plaintext message submitted for ++AE encryption. If 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖+1 =
𝑃𝑖+2 = 𝑃𝑖+3 = 2
𝑏 − 1 (𝑖. 𝑒. −1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 2𝑏))   (where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 −
3), then the inner vectors 𝐼𝑖+3 and 𝑄𝑖+3 will be equal to  𝐼𝑖−1 and 
Qi−1 respectively. 
Proof: 
From Lemma 1, we have: 
𝐼𝑗  = 𝑃𝑗 ⨁ 𝑄𝑗−1 
= (2𝑏 − 1) ⨁ 𝑄𝑗−1 
= 2𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑗−1 
, for 𝑗 = 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑖 + 2, 𝑖 + 3. 
𝑄𝑗 = 𝐼𝑗 + 𝐼𝑗−1 + 𝑄𝑗−1 
= 2𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑗−1 
, for 𝑗 = 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑖 + 2, 𝑖 + 3. 
Therefore: 
𝐼𝑖 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖−1 
𝑄𝑖 = 2
𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖−1                                                                              
 
𝐼𝑖+1 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖 = −𝐼𝑖−1 
𝑄𝑖+1 = 2
𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖 = 2(2
𝑏 − 1) − 𝑄𝑖−1                                               
 
𝐼𝑖+2 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖+1 = 𝑄𝑖−1 − (2
𝑏 − 1) 
𝑄𝑖+2 = 2
𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖+1 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝐼𝑖−1                                                  
 
𝐼𝑖+3 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖+2 = 𝐼𝑖−1 
𝑄𝑖+3 = 2
𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖+2 = 𝑄𝑖−1                                                              
Theorem 1 proves that the value of the inner vectors 𝐼𝑖+3 and 
𝑄𝑖+3, after processing four consecutive plaintext blocks each of 
value (2𝑏 − 1), will be the same as the values of 𝐼𝑖−1 and 𝑄𝑖−1. 
The repetition of the inner vectors is a weakness that can be 
exploited for forgery attacks. Note that this flaw is independent of 
the encryption key, the secret value 𝑆, the block cipher used and 
the block length. 
3.2 Plaintext blocks of value 𝟐𝒃−𝟏 − 𝟏 
We next consider the case when the plaintext blocks are equal to 
the integer (2𝑏−1 − 1). 
Lemma 2: Let (𝑎) be a 𝑏-bit binary number. Then, 
(2𝑏−1 − 1)⨁ 𝑎 ≡  2𝑏−1 − 1 − 𝑎(mod 2𝑏). 
Proof:  
Let 𝑎 = ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0  be the binary representation of (𝑎). 
Since 2𝑏−1 ≡ − 2𝑏−1 (mod 2𝑏), then: 
(2𝑏−1 − 1)⨁ 𝑎 = (2𝑏−1 − 1)⨁ ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0            
         = ∑ 2𝑗𝑏−2𝑗=0 ⨁ ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−1
𝑗=0             
         = (∑ 2𝑗 ⨁ ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−2
𝑗=0
𝑏−2
𝑗=0 ) + (0⨁𝑎𝑏−1. 2
𝑏−1)    
         = (∑ (1⨁ 𝑎𝑗)2
𝑗)𝑏−2𝑗=0 + (𝑎𝑏−1. 2
𝑏−1) 
         ≡ (∑ (1 − 𝑎𝑗)2
𝑗𝑏−2
𝑗=0 + 𝑎𝑏−1. 2
𝑏−1)(mod 2𝑏) 
         ≡ (∑ 2𝑗 −𝑏−2𝑗=0 ∑ 𝑎𝑗 . 2
𝑗𝑏−2
𝑗=0 − 𝑎𝑏−1. 2
𝑏−1)(mod 2𝑏) 
         ≡ 2𝑏−1 − 1 − 𝑎(mod 2𝑏)                                                    
Theorem 2: Suppose   𝑃 = 𝑃1, 𝑃2, . . , 𝑃𝑁+1 (where 𝑁 ≥ 4) is a 
plaintext message submitted for ++AE encryption. If 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖+1 =
𝑃𝑖+2 = 𝑃𝑖+3 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1   (where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 3), then the inner 
vectors 𝐼𝑖+3 and 𝑄𝑖+3 will be equal to  𝐼𝑖−1 and Qi−1 respectively. 
Proof: 
The proof of Theorem 2 directly follows the proof of Theorem 1, 
except that Lemma 1 is replaced by Lemma 2 and 2𝑏 is replaced 
by 2𝑏−1. 
3.3 Other plaintext blocks 
It is straightforward to show that the approach taken in Theorems 
1 and 2 can also be applied to the values: 2𝑏 − 2 and 2𝑏−1 − 2 for 
any block size 𝑏 ≥ 2.  
Therefore, 2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏 − 2 and 2𝑏−1 − 2 are the list of 
values from which we can choose a value to form a group of four 
identical consecutive plaintext blocks, so that the inner vectors 𝐼 
and 𝑄 before and after processing the group of blocks are the 
same. 
3.4 Mixing plaintext blocks  
Instead of choosing four identical consecutive plaintext blocks 
using one of the values listed in section 3.3, we can alternate the 
values of the plaintext blocks.  
Theorem 3: Suppose   𝑃 = 𝑃1, 𝑃2, . . , 𝑃𝑁+1 (where 𝑁 ≥ 4) is a 
plaintext message submitted for ++AE encryption. If 
𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖+1, 𝑃𝑖+2, 𝑃𝑖+3 = (2
𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1), 
                                        (2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1), 
                                        (2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1), 
                                        (2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1), 
                                        (2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1), 
                                    or (2𝑏−1 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏 − 1, 2𝑏−1 − 1) 
(where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 3), then the inner vectors 𝐼𝑖+3 and 𝑄𝑖+3 will 
be equal to  𝐼𝑖−1 and Qi−1 respectively. 
Proof: 
From Lemma 1&2: 
For 𝑃𝑗 = 2
𝑏 − 1: 
        𝐼𝑗 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑗−1, for 𝑗 = 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑖 + 2, 𝑖 + 3. 
      𝑄𝑗 = 2
𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑗−1, for 𝑗 = 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑖 + 2, 𝑖 + 3. 
For 𝑃𝑗 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1: 
        𝐼𝑗 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1 − 𝑄𝑗−1, for 𝑗 = 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑖 + 2, 𝑖 + 3. 
      𝑄𝑗 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1 + 𝐼𝑗−1, for 𝑗 = 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑖 + 2, 𝑖 + 3. 
 
If 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖+1, 𝑃𝑖+2, 𝑃𝑖+3 = (2
b − 1, 2b−1 − 1, 2b − 1, 2b−1 − 1): 
𝐼𝑖 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖−1 
𝑄𝑖 = 2
𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖−1 
𝐼𝑖+1 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖 = −2
𝑏−1 − 𝐼𝑖−1 
𝑄𝑖+1 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖 = 3(2
𝑏−1) − 2 − 𝑄𝑖−1 
𝐼𝑖+2 = 2
𝑏 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖+1 = 𝑄𝑖−1 − (2
𝑏−1 − 1) 
𝑄𝑖+2 = 2
𝑏 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖+1 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1 − 𝐼𝑖−1 
𝐼𝑖+3 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1 − 𝑄𝑖+2 = 𝐼𝑖−1 
𝑄𝑖+3 = 2
𝑏−1 − 1 + 𝐼𝑖+2 = 𝑄𝑖−1 
For other cases, the essential difference from the previous one is 
that we change the position of 2𝑏 and 2𝑏−1. Therefore, the proofs 
of these cases exactly follow the above proof.                               
Note that if we change 2𝑏 − 1 and  2𝑏−1 − 1 to 2𝑏 − 2 
and 2𝑏−1 − 2, the above approach still gives the same results. 
Combining the cases presented in this section with those listed in 
section 3.3, there are 16 possible combinations of four 
consecutive plaintext blocks that result in the inner vectors 𝐼 
and 𝑄 being repeated, for any block size 𝑏 ≥ 2. 
4. PROPOSED FORGERY ATTACKS 
The forgery attacks we propose only require a single chosen 
plaintext message to be encrypted using ++AE. The attacker can 
use the corresponding ciphertext and modify it in various ways 
without invalidating the MDC or its decryption to the original 
ICV provided the length of the ciphertext is unchanged. Possible 
modifications include inserting and deleting certain ciphertext 
blocks, or reordering them. The attack is deterministic and the 
modified ciphertext is guaranteed to pass the ++AE integrity test 
during decryption. These forgeries are applicable to both versions 
of ++AE. 
4.1 Forgery attack using insertion and 
deletion 
For this proposed attack, suppose a plaintext message 𝑃 contains 
two separate groups of four identical consecutive blocks whose 
values are chosen from the list in section 3.3. The value chosen 
for one group may be different from the second group value. We 
denote these two values as 𝑟1 and 𝑟2. The message is chosen as 
follows: 
𝑃 = 𝑃1, 𝑃2, . . , 𝑃𝑁+1 (𝑁 ≥ 9) 
where 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖+1 = 𝑃𝑖+2 = 𝑃𝑖+3 = 𝑟1 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 8) 
and 
 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑗+1 = 𝑃𝑗+2 = 𝑃𝑗+3 = 𝑟2  (𝑖 + 5 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑁 − 3) 
 
as shown in Figure 4. This message is encrypted using ++AE to 
produce a ciphertext message 𝐶 = 𝐶1, 𝐶2, . . , 𝐶𝑁+1, such that 
𝐶𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖+1, 𝐶𝑖+2, 𝐶𝑖+3 correspond to  𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖+1, 𝑃𝑖+2, 𝑃𝑖+3 and 
𝐶𝑗 , 𝐶𝑗+1, 𝐶𝑗+2, 𝐶𝑗+3 correspond to 𝑃𝑗 , 𝑃𝑗+1, 𝑃𝑗+2, 𝑃𝑗+3. 
 
Figure 4. The chosen message 
 
Figure 5. Forgery attack using insertion and deletion 
One way in which we can construct a forged ciphertext message 
𝐶∗ from the obtained ciphertext 𝐶, is by deleting the four 
consecutive ciphertext blocks (𝐶𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖+1, 𝐶𝑖+2, 𝐶𝑖+3), and repeating 
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the four consecutive ciphertext blocks (𝐶𝑗 , 𝐶𝑗+1, 𝐶𝑗+2, 𝐶𝑗+3). The 
forged ciphertext message is established as follows: 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘  (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 − 1), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘+4 (𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑗 − 1), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘  (𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 + 1). 
Such a forged message C∗, as illustrated in Figure 5, will not cause 
any change in the number of blocks 𝑁. It will also produce the 
same MDC and decrypt to give the same ICV, so it will be 
accepted as genuine by the receiver.  
Another way to construct a forged ciphertext message from 𝐶 is 
by inserting the (𝐶𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖+1, 𝐶𝑖+2, 𝐶𝑖+3) blocks after the original ones 
and deleting the (𝐶𝑗 , 𝐶𝑗+1, 𝐶𝑗+2, 𝐶𝑗+3) blocks. That is, the forged 
message will be as follows:  
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘  (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 + 3), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘−4 (𝑖 + 4 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑗 + 3), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘  (𝑗 + 4 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 + 1). 
Note that this approach can be used for any of the four plaintext-
block values mentioned in Section 3.3. Thus, there are multiple 
chosen plaintext messages that can be used to obtain ciphertext 
messages, each of which can be manipulated in various ways to 
obtain multiple forgeries. 
4.2 Forgery attack using swapping  
Instead of insertion and deletion using two separate groups of four 
identical consecutive plaintext messages, we can also use two 
consecutive groups where each group of four identical 
consecutive plaintext blocks uses a different value chosen from 
the list of values mentioned in Section 3.3. One way in which the 
attacker can construct a forged ciphertext message is by swapping 
the ciphertext blocks of the two groups. These modifications do 
not cause any change in the number of blocks 𝑁, or in the internal 
chaining values, 𝑄 and 𝐼. Hence, The MDC and its decryption to 
the original ICV will remain unchanged.  
To illustrate the proposed attacks, suppose a plaintext message 𝑃 
contains two consecutive groups of four identical consecutive 
plaintext blocks whose values are chosen from the list in section 
3.3. In the first group the plaintext blocks all have the value 𝑟1 and 
in the second group the plaintext blocks all have the value 𝑟2 
provided that 𝑟1 is different form 𝑟2. These two groups can be 
anywhere in the plaintext before the last block:  
𝑃 = 𝑃1, 𝑃2, . . , 𝑃𝑁+1 (𝑁 ≥ 8) 
where 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖+1 = 𝑃𝑖+2 = 𝑃𝑖+3 = 𝑟1 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 7) 
and 
𝑃𝑖+4 = 𝑃𝑖+5 = 𝑃𝑖+6 = 𝑃𝑖+7 = 𝑟2  (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 7). 
This message is encrypted using ++AE to produce a ciphertext 
message 𝐶 = 𝐶1, 𝐶2, . . , 𝐶𝑁+1 where 𝐶𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖+1, 𝐶𝑖+2, 𝐶𝑖+3 correspond 
to  𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖+1, 𝑃𝑖+2, 𝑃𝑖+3 and 𝐶𝑖+4, 𝐶𝑖+5, 𝐶𝑖+6, 𝐶𝑖+7 correspond 
to 𝑃𝑖+4, 𝑃𝑖+5, 𝑃𝑖+6, 𝑃𝑖+7. 
We can construct a forged ciphertext message 𝐶∗ from the 
obtained ciphertext 𝐶, by swapping the four consecutive 
ciphertext blocks (𝐶𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖+1, 𝐶𝑖+2, 𝐶𝑖+3) with the ciphertext 
blocks (𝐶𝑖+4, 𝐶𝑖+5, 𝐶𝑖+6, 𝐶𝑖+7). The forged ciphertext message is 
established as follows: 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘  (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 − 1), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘+4 (𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 + 3), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘−4 (𝑖 + 4 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 + 7), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘  (𝑖 + 8 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 + 1). 
Such a forged message, C∗, as illustrated in Figure 6, will produce 
the same MDC and decrypt to give the same ICV, so it will be 
accepted as genuine by the receiver. 
Instead of swapping, we can construct other forged messages from 
𝐶 by replacing the ciphertext blocks of one group with the 
ciphertext blocks of the second group. If the ciphertext blocks of 
the first group are replaced by the ciphertext blocks of the second 
group, the forged message is constructed as follows:  
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘 (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 − 1), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘+4 (𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 + 3), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘 (𝑖 + 4 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 + 1). 
However, if the ciphertext blocks of the second group are replaced 
by the ciphertext blocks of the first group, the forged message is 
established as follows: 
 𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘 (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 + 3), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘−4 (𝑖 + 4 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑖 + 7), 
𝐶𝑘
∗ = 𝐶𝑘 (𝑖 + 8 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 + 1). 
Note that the same procedure is also valid for any two different 
values mentioned in Section 3.3. Hence, more plaintext messages 
can be chosen to obtain ciphertext messages, each of which can be 
manipulated in various ways to obtain multiple forgeries. 
 
Figure 6. Forgery attack using swapping 
4.3 Forgery attack with mixed value blocks 
For the forgeries described in sections 4.1 and 4.2, we assume that 
the four consecutive plaintext blocks in each group are all of the 
same value chosen from the list in Section 3.3. Note that using 
Theorem 3 these four blocks can have mixed values and still  do 
not change the internal chaining values, 𝑄 and 𝐼. Thus, the 
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forgeries presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2 are also valid for the 
twelve groups of four consecutive mixed-value plaintext blocks 
listed in Section 3.4.  
5. EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION 
In this section, we verify the proposed forgery attacks on ++AE 
experimentally. The underlying block cipher used in this 
experiment is AES with a 128-bit key. The experiment is 
implemented using C language and the implementation is run on a 
desktop computer with 64-bit Windows 7 Enterprise operating 
system and Intel Core i7-4790 3.6GHz processor. 
5.1 Performing a forgery attack using 
insertion and deletion 
The experiment is performed for a plaintext message of eleven 
128-bit blocks as follows: 
1. An attacker chooses a plaintext message containing two 
separate groups such that each group contains four 
consecutive identical blocks. 
2. The eleven-block plaintext is encrypted using ++AE 
mode with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher. 
3. The attacker can construct a forged message by deleting 
the ciphertext blocks correspond to one group and 
repeating the ciphertext blocks correspond to the second 
group, as shown in Figure 5. 
4. The modified ciphertext is decrypted using ++AE mode 
with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher. 
We demonstrated the above forgery attack with a specific 
example, as follows: 
1. Form a plaintext of eleven 128-bits blocks considering 
the last block as the ICV, as shown in Table 1. The 
message has the blocks (𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝑃4, 𝑃5) = (2
128 −
1, 2128 − 1, 2128 − 1, 2128 − 1) as one group and the 
blocks (𝑃7, 𝑃8, 𝑃9, 𝑃10)    =   (2
127 − 2, 2127 − 2, 2127 −
2, 2127 − 2) as the second group. The two groups are 
shown in bold. The remaining plaintext blocks have 
been chosen randomly. 
Table 1. The chosen plaintext message 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ea 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710 
 
2. Table 2 shows the ciphertext obtained from the 
encryption of the message in Table 1. The 
corresponding ciphertext blocks (𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4, 𝐶5) and 
(𝐶7, 𝐶8, 𝐶9, 𝐶10) are shown in bold. 
 
 
Table 2. The obtained ciphertext message 
b9501472308964e206f3652aa72ccdd6 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
469c7fcb75d5d9a1b418cb997b09a185 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
469c7fcb75d5d9a1b418cb997b09a185 
c213b40c852738f6d446d79eb8f79b03 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
3758893b632fd6857c89f9b5aeb1427d 
 
3. We modify the ciphertext by deleting the ciphertext 
blocks (𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4, 𝐶5) and repeating the ciphertext 
blocks (𝐶7, 𝐶8, 𝐶9, 𝐶10), as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. The forged ciphertext message 
b9501472308964e206f3652aa72ccdd6 
c213b40c852738f6d446d79eb8f79b03 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
3758893b632fd6857c89f9b5aeb1427d 
 
4. We decrypt the modified ciphertext to obtain the 
message shown in Table 4. Note that the obtained 
plaintext message is different to the original chosen 
plaintext shown in Table 1, but both have the same last 
block. 
Table 4. The decrypted forged message 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ea 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710 
 
5.2 Performing a forgery attack using 
swapping 
The experiment is performed for a plaintext message of ten 128-
bit blocks as follows: 
1. An attacker chooses two consecutive groups of four 
consecutive identical blocks. The value chosen for one 
group should be different from the second group value 
2. The ten-block plaintext is encrypted using ++AE mode 
with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher. 
3. The attacker can construct a forged message by 
swapping the ciphertext blocks of the two groups, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
4. The modified ciphertext is decrypted using ++AE mode 
with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher.  
We demonstrated the above forgery attack with a specific 
example as follows: 
1. Form a plaintext of ten 128-bits blocks considering the 
last block as the ICV, as shown in Table 5. The message 
has the blocks (𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝑃4, 𝑃5) = (2
128 − 1, 2128 −
1, 2128 − 1, 2128 − 1) as one group and the 
blocks (𝑃6, 𝑃7, 𝑃8, 𝑃9)     =    (2
127 − 2, 2127 − 2, 2127 −
2, 2127 − 2) as the second group. The two groups are 
shown in bold. The remaining plaintext blocks have 
been chosen randomly. 
Table 5. The chosen plaintext message 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710 
 
2. Table 6 shows the ciphertext obtained from the 
encryption of the message in Table 5. The 
corresponding ciphertext blocks (𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4, 𝐶5) and 
(𝐶6, 𝐶7, 𝐶8, 𝐶9) are shown in bold. 
Table 6. The obtained ciphertext message 
b9501472308964e206f3652aa72ccdd6 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
469c7fcb75d5d9a1b418cb997b09a185 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
469c7fcb75d5d9a1b418cb997b09a185 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
e0cd0b77eed4f7041fde256038dbf51f 
 
3. We modify the ciphertext by swapping the ciphertext 
blocks (𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4, 𝐶5) and the ciphertext 
blocks (𝐶6, 𝐶7, 𝐶8, 𝐶9) , as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. The forged ciphertext message 
b9501472308964e206f3652aa72ccdd6 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
4106dc419a06db149dd22bfb583ffeee 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
469c7fcb75d5d9a1b418cb997b09a185 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
469c7fcb75d5d9a1b418cb997b09a185 
e0cd0b77eed4f7041fde256038dbf51f 
 
4. We decrypt the modified ciphertext to obtain the 
message shown in Table 8. Note that the obtained 
plaintext message is different to the original chosen 
plaintext shown in Table 5, but both have the same last 
block. 
Table 8. The decrypted forged message 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710 
 
5.3 Performing a forgery attack with mixed 
value blocks 
In this experiment we perform a forgery attack using insertion and 
deletion for a plaintext message of eleven 128-bit blocks exactly 
as described in Section 5.1 except that the plaintext blocks have 
mixed values. 
We demonstrated this forgery attack with a specific example as 
follows: 
1. Form a plaintext of eleven 128-bits blocks considering 
the last block as the ICV, as shown in Table 9. The 
message has the blocks (𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝑃4, 𝑃5) = (2
128 −
1, 2127 − 1, 2128 − 1, 2127 − 1) as one group and the 
blocks  (𝑃7, 𝑃8, 𝑃9, 𝑃10) = (2
128 − 2, 2127 − 2, 2128 −
2, 2127 − 2) as the second group. The two groups are 
shown in bold. The remaining plaintext blocks have 
been chosen randomly. 
Table 9. The chosen plaintext message 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ea 
fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe 
f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710 
 
2. Table 10 shows the ciphertext obtained from the 
encryption of the message in Table 9. The 
corresponding ciphertext blocks (𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4, 𝐶5) and 
(𝐶7, 𝐶8, 𝐶9, 𝐶10) are shown in bold. 
Table 10. The obtained ciphertext message 
b9501472308964e206f3652aa72ccdd6 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
e2c75fad134f621d9223df0a9c2793d8 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
e2c75fad134f621d9223df0a9c2793d8 
c213b40c852738f6d446d79eb8f79b03 
973f2ef34879e2027f1734303ff21f89 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
973f2ef34879e2027f1734303ff21f89 
f6c71eedc3d99bb183cb5b8d1568e606 
3758893b632fd6857c89f9b5aeb1427d 
 
3. We modify the ciphertext by deleting the ciphertext 
blocks (𝐶7, 𝐶8, 𝐶9, 𝐶10) and repeating the ciphertext 
blocks (𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4, 𝐶5), as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. The forged ciphertext message 
b9501472308964e206f3652aa72ccdd6 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
e2c75fad134f621d9223df0a9c2793d8 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
e2c75fad134f621d9223df0a9c2793d8 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
e2c75fad134f621d9223df0a9c2793d8 
8b6af01acb7464cb68c4a3548aaf95a6 
e2c75fad134f621d9223df0a9c2793d8 
c213b40c852738f6d446d79eb8f79b03 
3758893b632fd6857c89f9b5aeb1427d 
 
4. We decrypt the modified ciphertext to obtain the 
message shown in Table 12. Note that the obtained 
plaintext message is different to the original chosen 
plaintext shown in Table 9, but both have the same last 
block. 
Table 12. The decrypted forged message 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ea 
f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710 
6. CONCLUSION 
The ++AE proposal has been submitted to the CAESAR 
competition for authenticated encryption. In this paper, we 
reviewed the internal structure of ++AE mode of operation. We 
found ++AE has a flaw that can be exploited in a chosen plaintext 
forgery attack. The flaw is due to the fact that for certain input 
block values, the encryption of four consecutive plaintext blocks 
will result in the values of the internal chaining values, 𝑄 and 𝐼 
being repeated. Such repetition occurs for several different sets of 
four consecutive plaintext blocks.  
This flaw enables an attacker to choose a plaintext and use the 
corresponding ciphertext to construct multiple forged messages 
that will be accepted as authentic messages during decryption. An 
attacker can either delete and insert particular ciphertext blocks in 
the original cipher message or reorder them. The forged messages 
are guaranteed to pass ++AE integrity test regardless of the 
encryption key, the block cipher used and the block length. That 
is, the success rate for this attack is 100%.  
Given a chosen plaintext scenario, we performed the proposed 
forgery attacks for a selection of chosen plaintext messages and 
for both the insertion and deletion approach and the swapping 
approach. The experiments were conducted using an 
implementation of ++AE with 128-bit AES as the underlying 
block cipher. In every case, the forgery resulted in the correct 
ICV, and so would not be detected as modified by a receiver.  
Based on these results, we conclude that ++AE has a serious flaw 
in the integrity assurance mechanism. The mode should not be 
considered suitable for authenticated encryption. 
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